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Abstract
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views
every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple
priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the
corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends
and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the ﬁrst
domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and
the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core
of the corresponding hedonic games. Moreover, an element of the
strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial
time, while ﬁnding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion
is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain
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1restrictions and some suﬃcient conditions for non-emptiness of the
core already known in the literature.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The study of the hedonic aspect of coalition formation goes back to Drèze
and Greenberg (1980) who stress the dependence of a player’s utility on the
composition of members of her coalition. The formal model of a hedonic game
was introduced by Banerjee, Konishi and Sönmez (2001) and Bogomolnaia
and Jackson (2002). In their work, the focus on the identity of the members
of a coalition determines the structure of the game: the latter consists of
a preference ranking, for each player, over the coalitions that player may
belong to.
Despite the simplicity of the model, it turned out that the question of the
existence of a core stable partition, that is, a partition of the set of all players
for which there is no group of individuals who can all be better oﬀ by forming
a new deviating coalition, does not have an easy answer. In this paper we
restrict ourselves to hedonic games with separable preferences, i.e. games
where the eﬀect of a given player on another player’s preferences is the same,
regardless of which coalition the latter player is a member of. In such games
every player partitions the society into desirable and undesirable coalitional
partners (friends and enemies, respectively), and the division between friends
and enemies guides the ordering of coalitions in the sense that adding a friend
leads to a more preferable coalition, while adding an enemy leads to a less
preferable coalition.
2As shown by Banerjee, Konishi and Sönmez (2001), non-emptiness of the
core is not guaranteed even if one restricts separability to additive separa-
bility (players’ preferences are representable by an additive separable utility
function) and imposes in addition symmetry (i.e. the players have the same
reciprocal values for each other). For an excellent study of the role of symmet-
ric additive separable preferences for non-emptiness of the core of a hedonic
game the reader is referred to Burani and Zwicker (2003).
In this paper we impose neither symmetry nor mutuality (i.e. the friend-
ship among players is always mutual) on players’ preferences. However, we
restrict the domain of additive separable preferences by assuming that each
player uses a simple priority criterion when comparing coalitions she may
belong to. As a result, the class of additive separable preferences based on
appreciation of friends and the class of additive separable preferences based
on aversion to enemies are considered. The ﬁrst preference domain corre-
sponds to a situation in which every player in the game has very strong
friends and very weak enemies: when comparing two coalitions she may be-
long to, a player who appreciates her friends pays attention ﬁrst to the friends
in either coalition. The coalition that contains more friends is declared by
the player as better than the other, and if the two coalitions have the same
number of friends, then the coalition with less enemies wins the comparison.
The second preference domain displays a situation in which every player has
very strong enemies and very weak friends, i.e. a player who is averse to
her enemies looks ﬁrst at the enemies in either coalition. The coalition that
contains less enemies is declared by the player as better than the other, and
if the two coalitions have the same number of enemies, then the number of
friends is decisive for the comparison. Notice that both restrictions allow for
indiﬀerences in the corresponding rankings over coalitions.
3It turns out that friends appreciation is a suﬃcient condition for non-
emptiness of the strong core and that enemies aversion guarantees non-
emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games. In addition,
we show that an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be
found in polynomial time, while ﬁnding an element of the weak core under
enemies aversion is NP-hard.
This paper serves three purposes. The ﬁrst is providing positive results
on the proposed preference domains: when the players are averse to their
enemies a weak core stable coalition structure exists, and when the players
appreciate their friends even the strong core is non-empty. The second is that
our domain restrictions can be seen as speciﬁc extensions of the rudimentary
information about one’s opinion over the single players (viewed either as
homogeneous enemies or as homogeneous friends) to an ordering over coali-
tions. Cechlárová and Romero-Medina (2001) propose a diﬀerent way for
extending preferences over single individuals to preferences over coalitions
(that coincide with her preferences over the most attractive member in the
corresponding coalitions) and show that the existence of a strong core stable
partition of the players into coalitions is not guaranteed when indiﬀerences
are allowed. In contrast, we allow for indiﬀerences and report a positive re-
sult on the preference domain based on appreciation of friends. Our third
purpose is the analysis of the computational complexity of the problem for
ﬁnding a core stable partition in hedonic games. For general hedonic games
this problem is shown to be NP-hard; moreover, if one imposes anonymity
(the players pay attention only to the size of the corresponding coalitions)
the problem remains NP-hard even when only strict preferences are allowed
(cf. Ballester (2003)). Cechlárová and Hajduková (2002) study the computa-
tional complexity for ﬁnding a strong core element for the speciﬁce x t e n s i o n
4of the preferences over individuals to preferences over coalitions proposed by
Cechlárová and Romero-Medina (2001) and show that when ties are included
the problem is NP-hard. Our domain restriction based on appreciation of
friends allows for indiﬀerences and it can be seen also as an attempt to con-
ciliate additive separability with a weaker notion of anonymity (only the
number of friends and the number of enemies count). We show that a strong
core element can be found in polynomial time.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal
model of a hedonic game and presents the formal deﬁnitions of our domain
restrictions. We introduce the notions of an internally stable coalition and
of a deviation stable collection of coalitions as our basic analytical tools in
Section 3, and relate them to core stability. The set of internally stable
coalitions has a special structure when restricting the preferences to friends
appreciation or to enemies aversion. This special structure is studied in Sec-
tion 4 and Section 5, respectively, where we present our core existence proofs
as well. Section 6 is devoted to the computational complexity for ﬁnding
a core stable element for hedonic games in our domains. In Section 7 we
brieﬂy comment on the relationship between the domain restriction based on
appreciation of friends and the domain restrictions proposed by Cechlárová
and Romero-Medina (2001) since the latter restrictions are also shown to give
rise to strong core stable hedonic games. We consider also the relationship
between the domain restriction based on aversion to enemies to other suﬃ-
cient conditions shown to guarantee weak core stability of the corresponding
games like the weak top coalition property of Banerjee, Konishi and Sönmez
(2001) and the ordinal balancedness condition of Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002).
52P r e l i m i n a r i e s
Consider a ﬁnite set of players N = {1,2,...,n}.Acoalition is a non-empty
subset of N.F o re a c hp l a y e ri ∈ N,w ed e n o t eb yNi = {X ⊆ N | i ∈ X}
the collection of all coalitions containing i. A collection C of coalitions is
called a coalition structure if C is a partition of N, i.e. the coalitions in C are
pairwise disjoint and
S
C∈C C = N.B yCN we denote the set of all coalition
structures of N. For each coalition structure C ∈ CN and each player i ∈ N,
by C(i) we denote the coalition in C which contains i,i . e .{C(i)} = C ∩ Ni.
We assume that each player i ∈ N is endowed with a preference ºi over
Ni, i.e. a binary relation over Ni which is reﬂexive, complete, and transitive.
We denote by P =( º1,º2,...,ºn) ap r o ﬁle of preferences ºi for all i ∈ N,
and by P the set of all preference proﬁles. Moreover, we assume that the
preference of each player i ∈ N over coalition structures is purely hedonic, i.e.
it is completely characterized by ºi in such a way that, for each C,C0 ∈ CN,
player i weakly prefers C to C0 if and only if C(i) ºi C0(i).
A hedonic game is a pair (N,P) consisting of a ﬁnite set N of players and
a preference proﬁle P ∈ P. This paper is devoted to the question whether
there exists a coalition structure C ∈ CN w h i c hi ss t a b l ei ns o m es e n s e .T h e
corresponding stability notions are given in Section 3.
We now specify the preference domains that will be considered. For each
i ∈ N,w el e tGi := G(ºi)={j ∈ N : {i,j}º i {i}} be the set of friends
of player i, and its complement Bi = N \ Gi the set of enemies of player i.
Notice that, from {i}º i {i},w eh a v ei ∈ Gi for each i ∈ N. The next deﬁn-
ition suggests two ways of how each player i ranks the sets in Ni depending
on the numbers of her friends and enemies.
Deﬁnition 1 Let P =( º1,º2,...,ºn) ∈ P be a proﬁle of players’ prefer-
6ences.
• We say that P is based on appreciation of friends if, for all i ∈ N
and all X,Y ∈ Ni,
X ºi Y ⇔

    
    
|X ∩ Gi| > |Y ∩ Gi|
or
|X ∩ Gi| = |Y ∩ Gi| and |X ∩ Bi| ≤ |Y ∩ Bi|.
• We say that P is based on aversion to enemies if, for all i ∈ N and
all X,Y ∈ Ni,
X ºi Y ⇔

    
    
|X ∩ Bi| < |Y ∩ Bi|
or
|X ∩ Bi| = |Y ∩ Bi| and |X ∩ Gi| ≥ |Y ∩ Gi|.
Thus, if the preference proﬁle is based on appreciation of friends, we have
a priority for friends when comparing two coalitions. If the preference proﬁle
is based on aversion to enemies, each player looks ﬁrst at her enemies when
comparing two coalitions. In the following, the set of all preference proﬁles
based on appreciation of friends is denoted by Pf, and the set of all preference
proﬁles based on aversion to enemies is denoted by Pe.
It is not diﬃcult to see that if players’ preferences are induced by either
way suggested by Deﬁnition 1, then each player i will be equipped with
a preference relation over Ni with Gi being its top and Bi ∪ {i} being its
bottom. The next example illustrates this point.
Example 1 Let N = {1,2,3} and G1 = {1,2}, G2 = {2}, G3 = {1,2,3}.
Let P =( º1,º2,º3) ∈ P.
7• If P ∈ Pf,t h e n
- the ranking over N1 is {1,2}Â 1 {1,2,3}Â 1 {1}Â 1 {1,3},
- the ranking over N2 is {2}Â 2 {1,2} ∼2 {2,3}Â 2 {1,2,3},a n d
- the ranking over N3 is {1,2,3}Â 3 {1,3} ∼3 {2,3}Â 3 {3}.
• If P ∈ Pe,t h e n
- the ranking over N1 is {1,2}Â 1 {1}Â 1 {1,2,3}Â 1 {1,3},
- the ranking over N2 is {2}Â 2 {1,2} ∼2 {2,3}Â 2 {1,2,3},a n d
- the ranking over N3 is {1,2,3}Â 3 {1,3} ∼3 {2,3}Â 3 {3}.
In fact, the preference proﬁles based on appreciation of friends and the
preference proﬁles based on aversion to enemies belong to a more general class
of preference proﬁles, namely the class of additive separable preferences.
Deﬁnition 2 Ap r o ﬁle P ∈ P of players’ preferences is additive separable
if, for all i ∈ N, there exists a function vi : N → R such that for all
X,Y ∈ Ni,







We denote the set of all additive separable preferences by Pas.F o r t h e
preference proﬁle P ∈ Pf in Example 1, one can take v1(1) = v1(2) =
v2(2) = v3(1) = v3(2) = v3(3) = 3 and v1(3) = v2(1) = v2(3) = −1.F o r
the preference proﬁle P ∈ Pe in the same example the choice can be v1(1) =
v1(2) = v2(2) = v3(1) = v3(2) = v3(3) = 1 and v1(3) = v2(1) = v2(3) = −3.
More generally, when P ∈ Pf, one can take, for each i ∈ N, vi(j)=n if
j ∈ Gi,a n dvi(j)=−1 otherwise; when P ∈ Pe, one can take, for each
i ∈ N, vi(j)=1if j ∈ Gi,a n dvi(j)=−n otherwise. Therefore, we have
(Pf ∪ Pe) ⊂ Pas.
All additive separable preference proﬁles are also separable. A proﬁle
P ∈ P of players’ preferences is separable if, for every player i ∈ N there is
8a partition (Gi,B i) of N such that for every j ∈ N and X ∈ Ni with j/ ∈ X,
we have [X ∪{j}º i X ⇔ j ∈ Gi] and [X ∪{j}¹ i X ⇔ j ∈ Bi].W ed e n o t e
the set of all separable preferences by Ps. Hence, the relation among Pf, Pe,






3 Core stability and internal stability
In this section, we introduce the concepts of weak and strong core stability
and our main analytic tool, namely the concept of internal stability.
By DN we denote the set of all collections of disjoint non-empty coalitions.
For each D ∈ DN and for each i ∈
S
D∈D D,w ed e n o t eb yD(i) the coalition
in D containing i, i.e. {D(i)} = D ∩ Ni. Notice that the empty collection of
coalitions belongs to DN, i.e. ∅∈DN. Observe further that each coalition
structure is also a collection of non-empty disjoint coalitions, and thus, CN ⊆
DN.
Deﬁnition 3 Let P ∈ P, X ⊆ N and D ∈ DN.
• We say that X is a strong deviation from D if ∅ 6= X ⊆
S
D∈D D,
and X Âi D(i) for each i ∈ X.
• We say that X is a weak deviation from D if ∅ 6= X ⊆
S
D∈D D,
X ºi D(i) for each i ∈ X,a n dX Âj D(j) for at least one j ∈ X.
By using these notions, we deﬁne now weak and strong core stability.
Deﬁnition 4 Let P ∈ P and C ∈ CN.
• We say that C is weak core stable if a strong deviation from C does
not exist.
9• We say that C is strong core stable if a weak deviation from C does
not exist.
Notice that {X} ∈ DN for every non-empty coalition X ⊆ N. Similar
to the notion of core stability for coalition structures, we deﬁne below the
notion of internal stability for coalitions.
Deﬁnition 5 Let P ∈ P and X ⊆ N with X 6= ∅.
• We say that X is weak internally stable if there is no Y ⊆ X which
is a strong deviation from {X}.
• We say that X is strong internally stable if there is no Y ⊆ X
which is a weak deviation from {X}.
We denote by W(N,P) the collection of all weak internally stable coali-
tions, and by S(N,P) the collection of all strong internally stable coalitions.
Observe that, for every P ∈ P and every C ∈ CN,w eh a v eC ⊆ W(N,P) if
C is weak core stable, and C ⊆ S(N,P) if C is strong core stable.
Recall that each ºi is reﬂexive, complete and transitive, i.e. the strict
preference Âi of each player i ∈ N is also transitive. Having this in mind,
the following lemma shows some kinds of transitivity in terms of deviations,
which provides a connection between core stability and internal stability.
Lemma 1 Let P ∈ P, D ∈ DN,a n dX,Y ⊆ N.
• If X is a strong deviation from D,a n di fY is a strong deviation from
{X},t h e nY is also a strong deviation from D.
• If X is a weak deviation from D,a n di fY is a weak deviation from
{X},t h e nY is also a weak deviation from D.
10Proof. Suppose X is a strong deviation from D,a n dY is a strong deviation
from {X}. Then, we have ∅ 6= Y ⊆ X ⊆
S
D∈D D.S i n c ee a c hºi is reﬂexive,
Y is a proper subcoalition of X, i.e. Y ⊂ X.F r o mX Âi D(i) and Y Âi X
for each i ∈ Y ,w eh a v eY Âi D(i) for each i ∈ Y . Therefore, Y is a strong
deviation from D.
Suppose X is a weak deviation from D,a n dY is a weak deviation from
{X}.A g a i n ,w eh a v e∅ 6= Y ⊆ X ⊆
S
D∈D D and Y ⊂ X.F r o mX ºi D(i)
and Y ºi X for each i ∈ Y ,w eh a v eY ºi D(i) for each i ∈ Y .M o r e o v e r ,
there exists a j ∈ Y such that Y Âj X. By combining with X ºj D(j),w e
have Y Âj D(j). Therefore, Y is a weak deviation from D.
Lemma 2 Let P ∈ P and X ⊆ N with X 6= ∅.
• If X 6∈ W(N,P), then there exists a strong deviation Y from {X} such
that Y ∈ W(N,P).
• If X 6∈ S(N,P), then there exists a weak deviation Y from {X} such
that Y ∈ S(N,P).
Proof. Suppose X 6∈ W(N,P) and every strong deviation Y from {X} is
such that Y 6∈ W(N,P).L e t Y be a strong deviation from {X} with the
smallest cardinality. Notice that Y 6= ∅, and by assumption, Y 6∈ W(N,P).
Thus, there exists a strong deviation Z from {Y }.F r o mL e m m a1 ,Z is also a
strong deviation from {X}. However, since each ºi is reﬂexive, every strong
deviation Z from {Y } must be a non-empty proper subcoalition of Y , i.e. ∅ 6=
Z ⊂ Y .T h u s ,w eh a v e0 < |Z| < |Y |, which contradicts the assumption that
Y i sas t r o n gd e v i a t i o nf r o m{X} with the smallest cardinality. Therefore,
there exists a strong deviation Y from {X} such that Y ∈ W(N,R) if X 6∈
W(N,P). By a similar argument, one can show that there exists a weak
deviation Y from {X} such that Y ∈ S(N,R) if X 6∈ S(N,P).
11From Lemma 2, we obtain the following characterizations of core stability
in terms of internal stability.
Theorem 1 Let P ∈ P. For every C ∈ CN,
•Cis weak core stable if and only if there does not exist any strong
deviation from C which is weak internally stable,
•Cis strong core stable if and only if there does not exist any weak
deviation from C which is strong internally stable.
This is a very useful theorem because, when weak (strong) core stability
is under consideration, the theorem allows us to concentrate only on strong
(weak) deviations which are weak (strong) internally stable.
In Sections 4 and 5, we show that a strong core stable coalition structure
exists for each P ∈ Pf, and a weak core stable coalition structure exists for
each P ∈ Pe. By summing up the above arguments, we come to the following
concepts, which allow us to provide constructive existence proofs.
Deﬁnition 6 Let P ∈ P and D ∈ DN.
• We say that D is weak deviation stable if, for each C ∈ CN with
D ⊆ C, there does not exist any strong deviation X from C such that





• We say that D is strong deviation stable if, for each C ∈ CN with
D ⊆ C, there does not exist any weak deviation X from C such that





Observe that, by deﬁnition, for each D ∈ DN, D ⊆ W(N,P) if D is weak
deviation stable, and D ⊆ S(N,P) if D is strong deviation stable. Moreover,
12from Theorem 1, the following corollary can be obtained immediately.
Corollary 1 Let P ∈ P. For every C ∈ CN,
•Cis weak core stable if and only if C is weak deviation stable, and
•Cis strong core stable if and only if C is strong deviation stable.
A sketch of our constructions of core stable coalition structures in the
following sections looks as follows:
• start with the empty collection of coalitions, which is weak (and also
strong) deviation stable;
• construct a new weak (strong) deviation stable collection of disjoint
non-empty coalitions by including a weak (strong) internally stable
coalition, and repeat this until a coalition structure (a partition of N)
is obtained.
So that, from Corollary 1, we will ﬁnally obtain a weak (strong) core
stable coalition structure.
4 Appreciation of friends
In this section, we show the strong core stability of all hedonic games with
preference proﬁles belonging to Pf.
Let us ﬁrst show a characterization of strong internally stable coalitions
(Lemma 3) and the structure of the collection S(N,P) of all strong internally
stable coalitions (Lemma 4).
13Let X ⊆ N with X 6= ∅,a n di ∈ X. For each positive integer t,l e t
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i (X) for each X ⊆ N and each i ∈ X. Also notice
that G∗
i(X) ⊆ X,a n dG∗
i(Y ) ⊆ G∗
i(X) for each Y ⊆ X.
The following lemma provides a characterization of strong internally sta-
ble coalitions.
Lemma 3 Let P ∈ Pf and X ⊆ N with X 6= ∅.T h e n ,X ∈ S(N,P) if and
only if G∗
i(X)=X for each i ∈ X.
Proof. Suppose X ∈ S(N,P) and there exists i ∈ X such that G∗
i(X) 6= X.
Since G∗
i(X) ⊆ X for each i ∈ X,w eh a v eX \ G∗
i(X) 6= ∅.B e c a u s e
|X ∩ Gj| = |G∗
i(X) ∩ Gj| for each j ∈ G∗
i(X) and since X \ G∗
i(X) is non-
empty, we have |X ∩ Bj| > |G∗
i(X) ∩ Bj| for each j ∈ G∗
i(X). Therefore,
from P ∈ Pf,w eh a v eG∗
i(X) Âj X for each j ∈ G∗
i(X).T h a ti s ,G∗
i(X) is
a strong deviation from {X}, and is also a weak deviation from {X}.T h i s
contradicts the assumption that X ∈ S(N,P).
Suppose X ⊆ N with X 6= ∅ and is such that G∗
i(X)=X for each
i ∈ X.L e tY ⊂ X be a non-empty proper subcoalition of X. Then, we have
G∗
i(X) \ Y 6= ∅ for each i ∈ Y , and thus, there exists a j ∈ Y such that
Gj ∩ (X \ Y ) 6= ∅.T h a ti s ,|X ∩ Gj| > |Y ∩ Gj|,a n df r o mP ∈ Pf,w eh a v e
X Âj Y for some j ∈ Y . It follows that there is no subcoalition of X which
is a weak deviation from {X}. Therefore, we have X ∈ S(N,P).
14Next, we show a useful property of the set of all strong internally stable
coalitions.
Lemma 4 Let P ∈ Pf.I fX,Y ∈ S(N,P) with X ∩ Y 6= ∅,t h e nX ∪ Y ∈
S(N,P).
Proof. Suppose X,Y ∈ S(N,P) with X∩Y 6= ∅.F r o mL e m m a3 ,i ts u ﬃces
to show that G∗
i(X∪Y )=X∪Y for each i ∈ X∪Y .R e c a l lt h a tw eh a v e ,f o r
each non-empty Z ⊆ N and each i ∈ Z, G∗
i(Z) ⊆ Z,a n dG∗
i(Z) ⊆ G∗
i(Z0) if
Z ⊆ Z0.T h u sG∗
i(X)∪G∗
i(Y ) ⊆ G∗
i(X ∪Y ) ⊆ X ∪Y for each i ∈ X ∪Y .I n
the following, we show that X ∪ Y ⊆ G∗
i(X ∪ Y ) for each i ∈ X ∪ Y .
Let i ∈ X ∩ Y . By assumption, G∗
i(X)=X and G∗
i(Y )=Y , and thus,
we have X ∪ Y = G∗
i(X) ∪ G∗
i(Y ) ⊆ G∗
i(X ∪ Y ) for each i ∈ X ∩ Y .
Let i ∈ X \ Y . By assumption, G∗
i(X)=X,a n dt h u s ,X ⊆ G∗
i(X ∪ Y ).
Let j ∈ X ∩ Y . Notice that such a j exists by assumption. Then j ∈
G∗
i(X ∪Y ), and by deﬁnition G∗
j(X ∪Y ) ⊆ G∗
i(X ∪Y ).S i n c eY = G∗
j(Y ) ⊆
G∗
j(X ∪ Y ),w eh a v eY ⊆ G∗
i(X ∪ Y ).T h u s ,X ∪ Y ⊆ G∗
i(X ∪ Y ) for each
i ∈ X \ Y . By the same argument, one can show that X ∪ Y ⊆ G∗
i(X ∪ Y )
for each i ∈ Y \ X.
Now we can conclude that X ∪ Y ∈ S(N,P) if X,Y ∈ S(N,P) with
X ∩ Y 6= ∅, and the proof is completed.
Having described, for games with preference proﬁles belonging to Pf,a
characterization of strong internally stable coalitions and the structure of the
collection S(N,P), we redirect our attention to the problem of core stability
of such games.
For each M ⊆ N,w ed e n o t eb ySM(N,P) the collection of all strong
internally stable coalitions which are subsets of M, i.e. SM(N,P)={X ∈
S(N,P) | X ⊆ M}.L e t GSM(N,P) be the collection of all largest coali-
tions among coalitions belonging to SM(N,P), i.e. GSM(N,P)={X ∈
15SM(N,P) || X| ≥ |Y | for all Y ∈ SM(N,P)}.O b v i o u s l y , SN(N,P)=
S(N,P). Notice that {i} ∈ SM(N,P) for each i ∈ M.H e n c e ,SM(N,P) and
GSM(N,P) are non-empty whenever M is non-empty.
The following proposition suggests a way for extending a strong deviation
stable collection of disjoint coalitions for P ∈ Pf.
Proposition 1 Let P ∈ Pf, D ∈ DN \ CN,a n dM = N \ (
S
D∈D D).I fD
is strong deviation stable, then D ∪ {D0} is strong deviation stable for each
D0 ∈ GSM(N,P).
Proof. Suppose D is strong deviation stable and let D0 ∈ GSM(N,P).
Observe that D∪{D0} ∈ DN and D0 ∈ GSM(N,P) ⊆ SM(N,P) ⊆ S(N,P).
In the following we show that D ∪ {D0} is strong deviation stable.
Since D is strong deviation stable, every X ∈ S(N,P) with X∩
S
D∈D D 6=
∅ cannot be a weak deviation from any C ∈ CN such that (D ∪ {D0}) ⊆ C.
Thus, a strong internally stable coalition X is a weak deviation from some
C ∈ CN such that (D ∪ {D0}) ⊆ C only if X ⊆ M.L e t X ∈ S(N,P)
with X ⊆ M and X ∩ D0 6= ∅.F r o mD0 ∈ S(N,P) and Lemma 4, we have
X∪D0 ∈ S(N,P).S i n c eX,D0 ⊆ M,w eh a v eX∪D0 ∈ SM(N,P).M o r e o v e r ,
if X ⊆ D0, then, from D0 ∈ S(N,P), X cannot be a weak deviation from
{D0},a n dt h u sX cannot be a weak deviation from any C ∈ CN such that
(D∪{D0}) ⊆ C.T h e n ,i fX 6⊆ D0 we have |X ∪D0| > |D0|, which contradicts
D0 ∈ GSM(N,P). Therefore, D ∪ {D0} is strong deviation stable.
Our main result in this section is the following.
Theorem 2 For each P ∈ Pf, a strong core stable coalition structure exists.
Proof. Extend the empty collection of coalitions (which is strong deviation
stable) to a strong deviation stable coalition structure of N in the way sug-
gested by Proposition 1. Then, from Corollary 1, such a coalition structure
16is strong core stable.
5A v e r s i o n t o e n e m i e s
The way of proving the existence of a core stable partition for the case of
appreciation of friends can be used also for the case of aversion to enemies.
First, we show a characterization of weak internally stable coalitions when
P ∈ Pe.
Lemma 5 Let P ∈ Pe and X ⊆ N with X 6= ∅.T h e n ,X ∈ W(N,P) if and
only if G1
i(X)=X for each i ∈ X.
Proof. If X ⊆ N with X ∩Bi 6= ∅ for some i ∈ X, then, from {i}Â i X, {i}
is a strong deviation from {X}, i.e. X 6∈ W(N,P).T h u s ,X ⊆ Gi for each
i ∈ X if X ∈ W(N,P). Obviously, G1
i(X)=X if X ⊆ Gi.
Suppose X ⊆ N with X 6= ∅ is such that G1
i(X)=X for each i ∈ X.L e t
Y ⊂ X be a non-empty proper subcoalition of X. Then, we have |X ∩Bi| =
|Y ∩Bi| =0and |X∩Gi| > |Y ∩Gi| for each i ∈ Y , i.e. X Âi Y .T h u s ,t h e r e
is no subcoalition of X is a strong deviation from {X},i . e .X ∈ W(N,P).
In other words, W(N,P) is the collection of all non-empty coalitions of
players in N such that, for each of these coalitions, the players like each other
under preference proﬁle P ∈ Pe.
As analogy to SM(N,P) and GSM(N,P),w ed e ﬁne WM(N,P)={X ∈
W(N,P) | X ⊆ M} and GWM(N,P)={X ∈ W M(N,P) || X| ≥ |Y | for all
Y ∈ W M(N,P)} for each M ⊆ N. Again, W M(N,P) and GWM(N,P) are
non-empty whenever M is non-empty.
17The following proposition suggests a way for extending a weak deviation
stable collection of disjoint coalitions for P ∈ Pe.
Proposition 2 Let P ∈ Pe, D ∈ DN \CN,a n dM = N \(
S
D∈D D).T h e n ,
if D is weak deviation stable, then D∪{D0} is weak deviation stable for each
D0 ∈ GW M(N,P).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. Again, observe
that D ∪ {D0} ∈ DN and D0 ∈ GW M(N,P) ⊆ W M(N,P) ⊆ W(N,P).I n
the following we show that D ∪ {D0} is weak deviation stable.
Since D is weak deviation stable, every X ∈ W(N,P) with X∩
S
D∈D D 6=
∅ cannot be a strong deviation from any C ∈ CN such that (D ∪ {D0}) ⊆ C.
Thus, a weak internally stable coalition X i sas t r o n gd e v i a t i o nf r o ms o m e
C ∈ CN such that (D ∪ {D0}) ⊆ C only if X ⊆ M.L e tX ∈ S(N,P) with
X ⊆ M and X ∩ D0 6= ∅.F r o mL e m m a5 ,w eh a v e|X ∩ Bi| = |D0 ∩ Bi| =0
for each i ∈ X ∩ D0. Then, if |X| ≤ |D0|,t h e nD0 ºi X for each i ∈
X ∩ D0, and thus, X cannot be a strong deviation for any C ∈ CN with
D ∪ {D0} ⊆ C. Moreover, from D0 ∈ GW M(N,P),w eh a v e|X| ≤ |D0| for
every X ∈ WM(N,P). Therefore, D ∪ {D0} is weak deviation stable.
With the help of this proposition, we are able to present our main result
in this section.
Theorem 3 For each P ∈ Pe, a weak core stable coalition structure exists.
Proof. Extend the empty collection of coalitions (which is weak deviation
stable) to a weak deviation stable coalition structure of N in the way sug-
gested by Proposition 2. Then, from Corollary 1, such a coalition structure
is weak core stable.
The next example shows that the strong core may be empty when the
players are averse to their enemies.
18Example 2 Consider N = {1,2,3} under aversion to enemies with G1 =
{1,2}, G2 = {1,2,3},a n dG3 = {2,3}. Clearly, the candidates for strong
stable coalition structures should be weak stable as well. As it can be eas-
i l ys e e n ,t h eg a m eh a st w ow e a kc o r es t a b l ee l e m e n t s : {{1,2},{3}} and
{{1},{2,3}}. Notice that {2,3} and {1,2} are weak stable deviations from
{{1,2},{3}} and {{1},{2,3}}, respectively. Therefore, no strong core stable
coalition structure exists.
6 Computational complexity
In this section, the computational complexity for ﬁnding core stable coalition
structures is considered.
We start with a lemma for the case of aversion to enemies.
Lemma 6 For every P ∈ Pe and every C ∈ CN, GW(N,P) ∩ C6 = ∅ if C is
weak core stable.
Proof. Let C ∈ CN be such that GW(N,P)∩C = ∅,a n dl e tX ∈ GW(N,P).
Then, we have |X| > |C(i)| for each i ∈ X. From Lemma 5, X ⊆ Gi for each
i ∈ X, i.e. |X ∩ Bi| =0for each i ∈ X.T h u s ,X Âi C(i) for each i ∈ X, i.e.
X is a strong deviation from C. Therefore, C is not weak core stable.
This lemma allows us to formulate our result on computational complexity
for ﬁnding any weak core stable partition in hedonic games with enemy averse
preferences.
Theorem 4 When P ∈ Pe, the problem of ﬁnding a weak core stable coalition
structure is NP-hard.
Proof. The NP-hardness is shown by reduction from the Maximum Clique
Problem, which is know to be NP-hard.
19Maximim Clique Problem: For a given undirected graph H =( V,E),
ﬁnd a clique with the maximum cardinality in H,w h e r eac l i q u eK in
H is a subset of V such that {i,j} ∈ E for every i,j ∈ K with i 6= j.
Let H be an undirected graph. Without loss of generality, we assume
that V = {1,2,...,n}. Consider the hedonic game (N,P) with P ∈ Pe such
that N = {1,2,...,n} and Gi = {i} ∪ {j ∈ N |{ i,j} ∈ E} for each i ∈ N.
Notice that, from Lemma 5, for each X ⊆ N, X ∈ W(N,P) if and only if X
is a clique in H,a n dGW(N,P) is the set of all cliques with the maximum
cardinality. Then, from Lemma 6, to each weak core stable coalition structure
belongs at least one clique X with the maximum cardinality. This implies
that the problem of ﬁnding weak core stable coalition structure when P ∈ Pe
is at least as diﬃcult as ﬁnding a clique with the maximum cardinality in
an undirected graph. Therefore, the problem of ﬁnding a weak core stable
coalition structure when P ∈ Pe is NP-hard.
Remark 1 Notice that, from the proof of Theorem 4, the problem of ﬁnding
aw e a kc o r es t a b l ec o a l i t i o ns t r u c t u r ew h e nP ∈ Pe remains NP-hard even if
the mutuality condition “j ∈ Gi if and only if i ∈ Gj”i si m p o s e d .
In the following, we show that when P ∈ Pf, a strong core stable coalition
structure can be found in polynomial time, by taking a graph theoretical
approach.
Theorem 5 When P ∈ Pf, a strong core stable coalition structure can be
found in polynomial time.
Proof. Let N = {1,2,...,n}, P ∈ Pf,a n dl e tH(N,P) =( V,E) be a
directed graph such that V = N and E = {{i,j} ∈ N × N | i 6= j, j ∈ Gi}.
Observe that, from the deﬁnition of G∗
i (in Section 4), for every X ⊆ N
and i,j ∈ X,w eh a v ej ∈ G∗
i(X) if and only if there exists a sequence
20k1,k 2,...,k m for some m ≥ 1 such that k1,k 2,...,k m ∈ X and k +1 ∈ Gk 
for each 1 ≤   ≤ m − 1.T h u s , j ∈ G∗
i(X) if and only if there exists a
directed path from i to j via vertices belonging to X.F r o m L e m m a 3 , w e
have X ∈ S(N,P) if and only if, for each i,j ∈ X with i 6= j,t h e r ee x i s t
directed paths via vertices belonging to X from i to j and from j to i.T h a ti s ,
X ∈ S(N,P) if and only if the induced subgraph of H(N,P) by X is strongly
connected, where the induced subgraph HX of H(N,P) by X is the directed
graph such that VX = X and EX = E ∩(X ×X).M o r e o v e r ,X ∈ GS(N,P)
if and only if the induced subgraph of H(N,P) by X is a strongly connected
component in H(N,P) with the largest number of vertices. From Theorem 2, a
strong core stable coalition structure can be found by repeating the following
algorithm:
• Set M := N and C := ∅.
• Repeat the following until M = ∅:
-F i n das e tX ⊆ M such that the induced subgraph of H(M,P) by X is
a strongly connected component in H(M,P) with the largest number of
vertices.
-S e tM := M \ X and C := C ∪ {X}.
• Return C.
Notice that the “Repeat” loop runs at most n times. Moreover, an algo-
rithm for ﬁnding all strongly connected components of a directed graph (i.e.
a strong decomposition of a directed graph) is proposed by Tarjan (1972),
which has running time O(n2). Therefore, a strong core stable coalition
structure can be found in O(n3) time.
217C o m p a r i s o n s
Let us now consider the relationship between our domain restrictions and
some other properties that have been shown to guarantee existence of core
stable coalition structures.
We start with the strong core stability for the case of appreciation of
friends. Up till now, strong core stability of hedonic games has been shown
to exist only on the two preference domains proposed by Cechlárová and
Romero-Medina (2001). These authors study hedonic games in which the
ranking over coalitions for each player is guided either by her most preferred
member of the group or by her least preferred member of the group. How-
ever, these authors show strong core existence only for the case when the
preferences of the players over single members are strict, which, in turn,
excludes the possibility of indiﬀerences when coalitions are compared. More-
over, Cechlárová and Romero-Medina (2001) provide an example of a game
with an empty strong core when ties are incorporated in the preference do-
main. In contrast, we do allow for indiﬀerences and show strong core exis-
tence.
Consider now the weak core stability for the case of aversion to enemies.
We ﬁrst construct an example of a hedonic game with such kind of prefer-
ences. After that we introduce two suﬃcient conditions for non-emptiness of
the weak core already known in the literature (the weak top coalition prop-
erty of Banerjee, Konishi and Sönmez (2001) and the ordinal balancedness
condition of Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002)) and show that the constructed
hedonic game satisﬁes none of them.
Every player in the next example is indiﬀerent among coalitions on the
same row and, for each i ∈ N, the top row corresponds to Gi and the bottom
22row corresponds to Bi ∪ {i}.




123, 125, 135 12, 23 23, 34
12, 13, 15 2 3
1 1234, 1235 1234, 2345
12345 124, 125, 234, 235 123, 134, 235, 345
1234, 1245, 1345 24, 25 13, 35
124, 134, 145 12345 12345




34, 45 345, 145, 135
4 15, 35, 45
1345, 2345 5
134, 145, 234, 245 12345
14, 24 2345, 1245, 1235
12345 125, 235, 245
1234, 1245 25
124
We ﬁrst consider the weak top coalition property.
Deﬁnition 7 (Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez (2001)) Given a hedonic game
23(N,P) and a player set V ⊆ N, a coalition S ⊆ V is a weak top coalition
for V if S has an ordered partition {S1,...,S } such that
(1) S ºi T for all i ∈ S1 and all T ⊆ V with i ∈ T,a n d
(2) T Âi S ⇒ T ∩ (
S
m<k Sm) 6= ∅ for all k>1,a l li ∈ Sk,a n da l l
T ⊆ V with i ∈ T.
A hedonic game satisﬁes the weak top coalition property if every player
set has a weak top coalition.
In order to see that the game in Example 3 does not satisfy this property,
let’s consider the player set V = {1,2,3}. Notice that no one of the singletons
can be a weak top coalition for V because it is not a top coalition for V (i.e. it
does not satisfy (1) in Deﬁnition 7). The same reason rules out all partitions
of candidates for a weak top coalition that have a singleton at the ﬁrst place.
B e c a u s et w oo ft h ep l a y e r si nV (1 and 2)p r e f e r{1,2,3} to every doubleton
consisting of players of V , all partitions of candidates for a weak top coalition
that have a doubleton at the ﬁrst place are ruled out as well. The whole set V
can not be a weak top coalition for itself because, let’s say, {3}Â 3 {1,2,3}.
Hence, V has no weak top coalition, i.e. the game does not satisfy the weak
top coalition property.
As we will see the same game does not satisfy the ordinal balancedness
condition either.
Deﬁnition 8 (Scarf (1967), Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002)) Af a m i l yB
of coalitions is called balanced if there exists a vector of positive weights dC,
such that for each player i ∈ N,
P
C∈B:i∈C dC =1 . A hedonic game (N,P)
is ordinally balanced if for each balanced family of coalitions B there exists
a partition of N such that for each i ∈ N there exists a coalition C ∈ B,
C ∈ Ni such that C(i) ºi C.
24In other words, if we would like to check whether a game is ordinally bal-
anced we have to ﬁnd a partition of N to each balanced family of coalitions,
such that every player in that partition is weakly better oﬀ in comparison to
her worst situation in the corresponding balanced family.
For the game in Example 3, let us take the following balanced family with
a balanced weight 1/2 for each coalition: B = {{1,2},{2,3},{3,4},{4,5},{1,5}}.
Notice that, given B, all players do not like to remain single in a partition.
Observe further that player 2 can be better oﬀ in a partition (in comparison to
her worst situation in B) if and only if that partition contains one of the coali-
tions {1,2}, {2,3}, {1,2,3}. Hence, the possible candidates for a partition
are: {{1,2},{3,4,5}}, which is not liked by player 3;o r{{2,3},{1,4,5}},
which is not liked by player 1;o r{{1,2,3},{4,5}}, which is not liked again
by player 3. Hence, for the balanced family of coalitions B there is no suitable
partition of N, i.e. the game is not ordinally balanced.
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